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 __________ 
 
Book Review: Kofi Annan and the Role of Morality in 
International Relations 
__________  
 
Robert Potts1 
 
 
It is difficult to think of a figure more closely tied up in the legacy of the modern United 
Nations than former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In his 2012 memoir, Interventions: A Life 
in War and Peace, Annan recounts his time in the highest office of the United Nations (UN) 
and pontificates on how he believes the organization must evolve to meet the continuing 
needs of a modern world. His approach is to examine his time in the seat of the chief 
diplomat through the lens of certain key events and the UN’s response to them. The 
unsparing critique brings in many of the highest figures in international relations over the 
past 20 years and is quick to cast blame anywhere Annan thinks it is due. Ultimately, the 
book serves two purposes: (1) to shore up Annan’s legacy as secretary-general and, more 
importantly, (2) to paint a path forward for an organization that many denounce as 
anachronistic. 
Kofi Annan is a child of decolonization. His father was an influential figure in the Gold 
Coast Colony, holding an executive position in an Anglo-African corporation but also deeply 
involved in the independence movement. Unlike political leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, 
Annan’s father, Henry Reginald Annan, was a gradualist and favored the slower progression 
toward independence pushed by the British themselves. It can be said that Annan grew up in 
a position of privilege compared to many in the contemporary Gold Coast society. He was 
also surrounded by politics, specifically intense dialogue and negotiation, from a young age. 
Annan’s generation came of age with the independence of the new state of Ghana and was 
filled with idealism – a feeling quickly quashed by the realities of African post-colonial 
statehood. For Annan personally, the devolution of Ghanaian government into dictatorship 
led to the conclusion that: “working for the UN was the best way to serve [his] country and 
[his] continent” (Annan 2012, 27). He moved from working in the UN offices in Geneva at 
the lowest possible level, to serving in Addis Ababa, and eventually moving to New York 
where he rose to the position of assistant secretary general for peacekeeping operations 
before his elevation to the UN’s highest position. He was the first sub-Saharan African to 
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 serve in this capacity and also the first to have come of age in the era of decolonization – a 
massive perspective shift for the organization as a whole. 
Interventions covers a period of Annan’s career beginning with the seminal events leading 
up to his elevation to the Secretary-Generalship and continues covering a couple significant 
conflicts in which he was involved following the expiration of his term. The book analyses 
international responses to crises in which Annan played some kind of role, such as the 
Rwandan Genocide and the AIDS epidemic. It does acknowledge areas in which Annan is a 
more controversial figure particularly, for example, the Oil-for-Food Program scandal of the 
early 2000s. It seems clear that the book has a subsidiary purpose of shoring up Annan’s 
reputation in rebutting his alleged involvement. Ultimately, the work revolves around 
Annan’s vision for necessary transformation to keep the U.N. a relevant organization into 
the new century. As Secretary-General he pioneered the adoption of the “Responsibility to 
Protect” doctrine government UN interventions, refocusing efforts from simply mediating 
conflicts to protecting basic human rights. His efforts focus on a fundamental conviction 
that the people of the world are the group that the UN ultimately ought to serve, not the 
self-interested member states. 
Annan is at his strongest in recounting the inner-workings of international politics. He is 
as adept a diplomat in his writing as in his political work, providing compelling insight into 
the operations of an incredibly complex and often misunderstood organization. Looking 
back, it is easy to ascribe blame to the UN for failure to respond in devolving situations such 
as Rwanda or for not committing sufficient resources to truly follow through on its idealistic 
promises such as the Millennium Development Goals. Such tactics frequently appear in the 
media outlets of developed countries like the United States, but they remain fuelled by a 
general lack of knowledge about how the UN must operate within its sphere. Bill Gates, 
founder of Microsoft and noted philanthropist, particularly lauded this aspect of Annan’s 
memoir, noting that: “For anybody who wants to understand the complexities of the role of 
the Secretary General, this book is an illuminating read” (Gates 2013).  In this sense, the 
memoir could be interpreted as a continuation of the legacy of Annan’s UN tenure — an 
attempt to humanize the largely bureaucratic and outmoded organization. For the people of 
the world to understand how the UN can help them, they must also understand the manner 
in which it functions and how they might seek to utilize its force for their betterment. A 
recurring statement that Annan makes quite convincingly is that the UN is not purposively 
for its member states, but it gains its legitimacy and ability to act from their consent. This 
simple reality is often a misunderstood fundamental concept restricting UN action. A failure 
to act is more likely the result of a lack of international consensus rather than a problem 
endemic to the organization, by Annan’s argument. 
This explanatory function connects quite closely to Annan’s core criticisms of the 
organization he served and its member states. He shines in denouncing the unwillingness of 
individual governments to commit the necessary resources for the UN to pursue its 
mandates, a consummate Secretary General even eight years removed from his tenure. True 
to his focus on the people and not the government, Annan presents an idealized vision of 
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 UN Peacekeeping. In doing so, he puts forward one of the most candid and powerful 
statements about the purpose of his organization and collective deficiency in its execution: 
 
Entering any arena of conflict, with its blue helmets and white vehicles and a 
flag symbolizing far more powerfully than any words shelter from the storm, 
the UN was making a solemn pledge: we have come to keep the peace. This 
was our commitment, and perhaps our greatest failure was never fully to 
grasp the enormity of this obligation (Annan 2012).  
 
Annan’s tenure in the high offices of the UN included some of the worst atrocities of the 
20th century such as Srebrenica and Rwanda. Interventions does not shy away from this fact 
and a certain degree of retrospection shows that these failures weigh heavily on Annan’s 
mind. It explains the politics behind many decisions that had tragic human repercussions, 
but denounces these politics in remarkably strong words for a diplomat. In a tone as close to 
disapproval as one will find in this memoir, Annan emphatically states that, “to a man, 
woman, or child for whom the presence of a blue helmet is all that lies between safety and 
certain death, talk of limited mandates, inadequate means, under-resourced missions — 
however accurate — is, at best, beside the point, at worst, a betrayal” (Annan 2012, 10-11).  
Throughout the work this theme is echoed; the argument that fundamental responsibility for 
failure to act rests on member states’ intransigence is strong and consistent. This 
denunciation is indeed one of Annan’s better points and well developed throughout the 
work.  
However there is an inherent weakness, in the fact that Annan leaves the blame entirely 
on the member states without apportioning some to the UN itself and its leadership. Indeed, 
throughout the work Annan is careful to avoid accepting any personal responsibility, either 
individually or ex officio for the Secretariat. He recognizes and speaks convincingly of his of 
the problems regarding member state involvement and a need to change this for moral 
reasons, but is in many cases quiet about the role of UN bureaucracy in the same areas. 
Nowhere does this become apparent than in the chapter on Rwanda -- a horrific event that 
unfolded while Annan was Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations. 
When questioned about the series of events leading up to Rwandan Genocide, Annan’s 
response has not changed in twenty years; he firmly holds that: “the problem had been in the 
international community’s collective refusal to act, through the UN in particular” (Annan 
2012, 74).  It is undeniable that the member states’ failure to adequately outfit the UN 
Assistance Mission for Rwandan Genocide (UNAMIR) and later disinclination to involve 
themselves in the unfolding conflict created serious problem, but Annan also admits to a key 
instance of personal fault: prior to the onset of the genocide, Annan’s Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) office received a telegram from Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, 
the Canadian officer in charge of UNAMIR, stating that there were plans for genocide and 
that UNAMIR had planned a raid on an arms cache, which was to be used in the executions. 
His response was to refuse Dallaire this request, stating that, “the overriding consideration 
being ‘the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force 
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 and unanticipated repercussions’” (Annan 2012, 53).  The next several pages are spent trying 
to justify this telegram, arguing that UNAMIR was inadequately equipped and that with 
Somalia fresh on all minds involved, they were not prepared to risk the lives of 
peacekeepers. Ultimately, Annan attempts to bring the blame back around be saying that, 
“the reason for this was clear to all: there was no appetite whatsoever in the Security Council 
to even consider the use of force in a peacekeeping mission…” (Annan 2012, 55). This 
argument remains not wholly convincing and Dallaire has since made a point to publicly 
protest that the genocide was functionally preventable but for DPKO refusal to sanction his 
planned arms raid. This is also the point on which many of Annan’s sharpest critics emerge. 
Rory Stewart, a British Member of Parliament, shows Annan’s sequence of events in a 
different light; he points out that, “[Annan] accepts responsibility for not contacting the 
Security Council. But having made the case against himself, Annan does not apologize. Nor 
does he blame a lack of international will to intervene” (Stewart 2012). Stewart does well to 
remind that the Security Council did not refuse to help, Annan chose to refuse Dallaire’s 
request and not even inform the council. 
One of the more interesting critiques of Annan’s work is a short review by Michael 
Ignatieff. In it, he sharply criticizes Annan for relying too much on moral prestige and the 
fundamental ideals of the UN rather than credible force. He points to one of Annan’s 
admissions in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide episode as among the most damning, 
namely the statement that, “[UNAMIR] was a peacekeeping force, sent in a deliberately weak 
and vulnerable form to engender the trust of both sides, which emerged as even weaker in 
reality due to the challenges of finding troops and equipment” (Annan 2012, 75-76). This is 
an illuminating response with regard to Annan’s typical pattern of assigning blame. It grants 
a certain degree of fault to the member states that failed to adequately supply UNAMIR, but 
it also indicates that the force was intentionally weak beyond that limitation. 
It is quite clear throughout Annan’s work that he is a firm believer in the moral power of 
the UN This exact situation makes it exceptionally clear, though, how flawed that view is 
when functioning in a real world situation. As Ignatieff astutely notes: “When moral prestige 
deludes itself into thinking it need not arm itself, it can make itself an accomplice to evil” 
(Ignatieff 2012). Annan admits freely all throughout Interventions that he is a firm believer 
in the moral prestige of the UN; his series of actions leading up to the genocide in Rwanda 
seem to validate Ignatieff’s assertion and lay some degree of blame at Annan’s feet, a charge 
he steadfastly continues to refuse. Throughout his career, though, Annan regularly exhibited 
what can only be described as, “dismaying faith in the deterrent force of good intentions” 
(Ignatieff 2012). While he often attributes the cause to intransigence on the part of the 
international community, Annan has with very few exceptions never been one to speak 
softly but carry a big stick, as U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt famously quipped. 
As Annan recounts the various successes and tragedies of his twenty or so years in high 
UN leadership, he consistently argues for the same points. He seeks to remind UN members 
the true affiliation of the UN is to its constituent people, not their governments. More 
importantly, he pushes for an evolution of the U.N. as a body, expressly stating that, “the 
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 aim is to alter the balance of power between state and citizen” (Annan 2012).  While Annan 
is part of a small group in the high echelons of international power pushing for such a shift, 
he is quite convincing in his part. Ignatieff explains this particular trend well, suggesting that 
Annan: “can be seen as an entrepreneur of moral standards, promoting new ideas of 
collective behavior, sovereign responsibility, and international criminal accountability for a 
world that briefly believed that globalization might bring us together” (Ignatieff 2012). 
Throughout his tenure in the UN, Annan was careful to cultivate a deep sense of morality 
and push the organization to accept new ideas. In line with this thinking, he spearheaded the 
push for the Millennium Development Goals and transitioned peacekeeping to accept the 
new Responsibility to Protect. He succinctly links many of the policy positions undertaken 
throughout his tenure as Secretary-General to support this fundamental idea of progress. 
The urgently needed paradigm shift that forms the core argument underlying Annan’s 
memoir is one with which the average person would be hard-pressed to disagree. His 
suggested new UN regime is focused on the protection and assurance of basic human rights. 
The stumbling blocks emerge when member states are forced to make sacrifices for this to 
happen, when a longstanding traditional world order is upended in support of the rights of 
the least of humanity. Nowhere is this quite so firmly seen as in the landmark adoption of 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine by U.N. member states. Annan describes this new idea 
in simple terms with an easily comprehensible benchmark; he declares that: “Ultimately, the 
success of our efforts on the question of intervention should not be measured in wars 
launched or sanctions imposed but in lives saved” (Annan 2012, 114). Sanctions and military 
incursions were a longstanding reality of international affairs and Annan does not suggest 
they are going to disappear, but recognizes that by looking at them one analyzes the wrong 
metric. This statement in and of itself is on balance uncontroversial. 
The Responsibility to Protect does not stop there, however. In Annan’s own words, it is 
an attempt to reimagine the very definition of sovereignty that has accompanied nation-
states from their inception. He holds that the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the peoples 
of the world rested on, “the question of whether we were dedicated, not to the power of 
states but to saving lives and defending the human rights of individuals” (Annan 2012, 115).  
In pushing the Responsibility to Protect, Annan believed that the answer to this question lay 
in changing the expectations of states. His ultimate goal was to create a world in which, 
“States bent on criminal behavior knew frontiers were not the absolute defense,” that they 
were held to be in the past (Annan 2012, 115).  Annan’s vision of a new U.N. that was not 
state-centric, but people-centric means a fundamental reimagining of the principle of state 
sovereignty more dramatic than any other in world history. Throughout the work, though, 
he is cogent and convincing as to why this is a necessity for the modern world. 
Annan is a remarkable figure that dominated the top echelons of international politics 
for almost two decades. He was a visionary and a moralist, one who saw his organization as 
flawed and sought to reform it. Even twenty years after the fact, he refuses to outright 
accept blame for his role in the international response to events such as the Rwandan 
Genocide. He can also claim remarkable successes in diplomatic resolution, which he is 
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 quick to share with anyone deserving a piece of credit. On the whole, his memoir is less 
about this legacy than about a vision for the future. He knows what his past record is and he 
must live with the consequences, but he genuinely seeks to create a world in which the global 
community will respond to crises better than it did in his time. In this aim, Interventions is a 
resounding success; Annan’s weaknesses emerge in reckoning with the past, but his strengths 
are looking forward to a brighter tomorrow. 
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